Art La Flamme

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri?s 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq addressed the information, social, and time critical variables of the contemporary operational environment. Zawahiri, as a senior leader and chief strategist for Al Qaeda and the pan-Salafist movement, used the letter as a means to offer guidance to Zarqawi, whom he viewed as a senior tactician but junior strategist.

Zawahiri is a longtime Mujahid. He began his involvement in the Salafist movement in his home country of Egypt, as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and later with the umbrella organization al-Jihad, or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. By the time al-Zarqawi took up arms against the Jordanian monarch in the mid 1990?s, Zawahiri has been detained and tortured by the Egyptian authorities for his crusade against what he perceived to be an apostate regime in Cairo, had fought in Pakistan and Afghanistan, had been expelled from Sudan, and even been arrested in Russia as he began his global effort to united the Salafist movements.

Zawahiri?s global perspective drives his view of the contemporary operational environment, and in his letter to al-Zarqawi, Zawahiri stresses the social critical variable over all others. Zawahiri believes that ?the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy – after the help and granting of success by God – is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries.?

Zawahiri stresses the cohesiveness and unit of action amongst all Muslims, and thus all Iraqis. He urges al-Zarqawi to conduct operations and undertake actions that will unite the Iraqis against the Americans and what he see as an apostate regime in Baghdad. They will find success, Zawahiri argues, ?by the alliance, cooperation and gathering of all leaders of opinion and influence in the Iraqi arena.?

But at the same time, Zawahiri also urges to show more restraint in conducting operations against the Shia, if for no other reason than embracing the importance of the social critical variable of the Iraqi environment.

?We must repeat what we mentioned previously, that the majority of Muslims don’t comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it. For that reason, many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shia. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won’t be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.?

But in addition to the social critical variable, Zawahiri also stresses the importance of time in al-Zarqawi?s operations. He urges al-Zarqawi to understand, appreciate and embrace the long struggle of which his efforts in Iraq are only a part. Zawahiri stresses that it will take considerable time to expel the Americans; establish an Islamic authority in Iraq, in the void created with the departure of the Americans; extend the jihad to neighboring secular states; and finally to take to war West, in order to defeat Israel. Zawahiri stresses this, knowing the strategic importance of the role time will play, and understanding al-Zarqawi?s tactical background.

Lastly, Zawahiri stresses the role that information plays as a critical variable both in the contemporary operational environment in Iraq, and in the global contemporary operational environment. He emphasizes recent media coverage from the international press, messages sent to the followers, and he specifically cites the role of the media in the struggle for the support of the people. He urges al-Zarqawi that ?more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma (community of believers). And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us.?

Zawahiri used his letter to al-Zarqawi to stress the information, social, and time critical variables of the contemporary operational environment in Iraq and around the world. Zawahiri?s emphasis on these three critical variables stresses the integrated nature of the critical variables, and his understanding of their role in the contemporary operational environment.

This entry was posted on Wednesday, September 10th, 2008 at 12:54 am and is filed under Blogging, Iraq, Military, War. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.